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Domestic Violence in the
First-Year Torts Curriculum
jennifer B. Wriggins
The New England Journal of Medicine has this description of domestic Vlo
lence: "victims are pushed, punched, kicked, strangled and assaulted with
various weapons with the intenc of causing pain, injury, and emotional dis
tress." ' Domestic violence is tortious activity, in addition to bemg often
although not always---criminal activity. 2 l t is a very common form of tortious
activity, although its incidence is difficult to determine. And yet domestic
violence, or what I call domestic violence torrs, is hardly covered in many
torts casebooks.3
Domestic violence torts should be included in torts casebooks and courses
for al leru;t four reasons. The first is simply that the h.arm caused by domestic
violence is widespread and has broad ramifications:• A second reason is that
certain cases can be useful in gaining a deeper understanding of docainal
jennifer B. Wriggins is a professor at t.bc Untversity of Maine School of Law. In spnng 200!> she is
a visiting professor at Harvard Law School and Boston UniversiLy law School
Thanks to the law and Society Association for the opportunity to present an earty draft of Lhis
anide at it.s annual meeting in 2003. Thanks to Lhe Association ofAmerican Law Schools for the
opportunity to presen t an early draft at its midyear meeting on tons. Thanks to Katy Moore and
Denn~ CarriJio , Unjvemty of Maine School of law, for exccllent research assistance, and thanks
to the memherl' of the Maim lAW Review for assistance in cite checlting. Ch ristine Hepler,
reference librarian at the school's Garbrecht law Library, was very helpful in locating materials. 1
am gr.ueful to Dean Colleen Khoury for summer research funding, and for supponing the
school's faculty scholarship series, at which a draft of this was presented. Thanks to Tom Baker
and Tom Russell for fruitful discussions of these ideas. My colleagues Lois Lupica and, espec1ally,
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pe~ted con\"erl'ations with me.
1.

Demetrios N. Kyriacou eL al., Risk factors for Injury LO Women from Domestic Violence, 341
New Eng.J. Med. 1892, 1892 (1999) .

2.

Intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress ts an example of tortious activity that
often IS based on conduct to which criminal penalties do not attach. Merle H. Weiner,
Dom~ tic Violence and tbc: Per Se Standard ofOutrage. 54 Md.. L. Rev. 183, 189 n.l 6 ( 1995).

3.

Domestic "iolence tons are tons such as assa ult, battery. false imprisonment, and intentional
innicuon of emotional disLress, comm1ued in the course of domestic violence. Jennifer
Wriggms, Domestic Violence Toru, 75 S Cal. 1.. Rev. 121, 123 n.8 (2001) .

4..

The broad impacL or domestic "\'iOicnee was outlined in Justice Souler's dissent 10 United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 631-37 (2000). The section on toru in t.he Dalton &
Schne1der casebook is excellenL, but the topic of domestic violence torts is so important tha t
1t should be included in Lhe requlred first-year tons course. Clare Dalton & Eli:w~bcth M.
Schne1der, Baltered Women and the Law 805-68 (New YorJ.:., 200 1). A11 ABA repon makes
the point t.hat domestic \iolence should be part of Lhe roru curriculum. Commi~ion on
Domestic Violence, American Bar Association, When Will They Ever Learn? Educating LO
End Domestic Violence, 25, 39-40 (Chicago, 1997)
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issues, pa rticularly concerning intentional infliction ofemotional distress, and
in highlighting the importance of intentional torts, which are often neglected
in casebooks. Intentional torts remind us that torts is not just about optimal
levels ofsafety in technology, but is also about basic limits on behavior by and
between human beings. The third reason is that inclusion of domestic vi~
lence to rts can be a vivid way to illuminate relationships between torts and
insurance--an important lesson in any torts course. Fourth , inclusion can
lead to thought-provoking, broad discussions about con policy, focusing on
issues suc h as what hanns are recognized, what harms could be recognized,
and how one measures hann . This article first discusses what I call the
underteaching of domestic violence torts and intentional torts generally, and
reasons for the underteaching.6 Next I discuss specific approaches and several
cases. O n my faculty profile page on the Web, t have included a bibliography
of cases a nd related materials, as well as excerpted cases and assignments.6
Reasons foT the Lack of Attention to Domestic Violence Torts
Domesti c violence torts are given short shrift for at least two related rea
sons. First is that the ton system by various mechanisms, in combination with
other factors, ensures that there are few published cases to even consider
including in a torts casebook or course. Second, the overriding focus of
twentieth- and twency-first-cenrury ton law has been a focus on accidental
injury. Consistent with this focus, domestic violence tons are conceptualized
(when they are thought about at all) as criminal or fumily law matters rather
than torts.
Why So Fw Cases?

It is difficult to determine exact numbers of reported domestic violence
con cases and even more diffi.culL to determine exact numbers of cases filed
and settled. But it is safe to say that there are few in relation to the amount of
domestic violence that occurs. To start with, intentional tort cases are only a
small proportion of tort cases dealt with by the legal system. 7 Domestic vio
lence tort cases, in rum, are likely to be a tiny proportion of intentional tOrt
cases filed. Recent searches in the Westlaw ALLCASES database for cases
containing the words dumi!Sticvio/enceand assault, battery, or intentional inflictilm;
of emotionaL distress, reuieved a total of 6,138 citations, but only 34 cases that

5.

At appropriale poinu ln the text 1 will reference five ca.sebooks: Dan B. Dobbs Be Paul T.
Hayde n, Toru and Compensation: Personal Accountability and Social Responsibility for
Injury, 4th ed. (St. Paul, 2001); Richard A. Epstein, Cases and Material on Tons, 7th ed. (New
York, 2001), Marc A. Franklin Be Roben L Rabin, Tort Law and Alternatives Cases and
Materials, 7th ed. (New York, 2001 ); Vincent R.johnson & Alan Cuno, SrudJes in Amencan
Ton Law, 2d ed. (Durham, N.C., 1999); Dominick Vetri et aJ., Tort Law and Practice, 2d ed.
(Newark, NJ., 2002). 1 rCVJewed fifteen casebooks generally. including the above.

6.
7.

See <h ttp:/ /mainelaw.mame.edu/ wriggins.hun>.
Accord mg lOa Bureau ofjustice Scuistics repon, in 1992,10,879 cases, or 2.9 percenr of the
tort cases, disposed of in the country's 751argest couruies were in tentionalton caso. Su..'Ven
K. Smith elal., Tort Cases in Large Counties, Civiljusticc Survey of State Couru 1992, at 2
(Bureau ofjustice Statistics, U.S. Department ofjusllce, SpeciaJ Repon NCJ-153177 (Wash
ington, 1995)).
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contained tort claims arising from domestic violence in an intimate or for
merly intimate relationship. 8 There was no indication that such cases were
more frequent in the recent past. 1 found no domestic violence tort cases in
the Civil justice database of the National Crime Victim Bar Association, which
includes over 11 ,000 cases. Data found by other researchers consistently
confirm the conclusion that very few tort cases arise from domestic violence. 9
How does the tort system, in combination with other mechanisms, ensure
that there are few reported cases in this area? One way is through tort statutes
of limitation, which typically are much shorter for assault, battery, and other
traditional intentional torts than for negligence or strict liability. Since domes~
tic violence torts by definition arise out of an ongoing relationship, a short
statute of limitations is likely to have a powerful impact in limiting claims. A
second way is through insurance. Domestic violence torts are inLentional torts.
The ubiquitous "intentional acts" exclusion in liability policies, which denies
coverage for harm caused by intentional acts of the insured, means that
liability insurance coverage such as homeowners' coverage or automobile
coverage is likely to be unavailable to pay claims. Another insur.mce aspect is
the "family member" exclusion commonly found in liability policies, which
means that a family member's claim against another family member-even for
negligence-will not be covered. Since most tort damages claims are paid out
of liabiHty coverage, the insurance exclusions virtually guarantee thal few
claims are brought. Moreover, most defendants do not have sufficicnl assets to
pay a judgment; if a couple is married, all assets may be jointly owned. Even if
a house is not jointly owned. it may be unattainable to satisfy a judgment
because it may be mortgaged, protected by a homestead exemption, or
encumbered by previous involuntary liens. Significant assets such as pensions
are indivtdually owned and protected from attachment by federal retirement
law. Ofte n divorce seltlements now include releases of tort claims signed by
both parries; such releases may also prevent parties from bringing claims.
Other factors leading to few reported cases include procedural requir~
ments in some places that tort claims must be brought with a divorce, 10 and
8.

Specifically, r.be search Quly SO, 2003) for cases containing r.be words domestic violma and
twaull retrieved 4,408 citations, going back to 1961. Only 22 contained tort claims arising
from domestic violence in an intimate or formerly incimatc relationship. The search Uuly 3J ,
2003) for cases comaining the words d.orriestic violence and bauery reoieved 1,598 citations, 25
ofwhich contained such ton claims. or those 25, 18 overlapped with cases rc:uieved with the
dow..strc violence and twault search, so there was a total of 29 separate cases between the two
searches. Similarly, the search Uune 12, 2003) fo r cases mentioning domtlStic violma and
rntent10nal injliclton ofemotrcmaldistress retrieved 132 cases go1ng back to 1982, only 13 ofwh 1ch
dealt with the sort of claims I was seeking. Eight of these overlapped with cases m the other
categones; in other words, there were 5 cases that dJd not fall in another category. Thus, the
three searches rumed up a total of 34 cases. Some of the 34 cases dealt with ton claims
brought as coum.erclatms m a diVorce, and some dealt with tort claims independent of
divorces. The overall figure of 6,138 citations includes cases that appear in more than one
category. These searches reveaJed thousands ofcrim1nal prosecutions pertaining to domestic
violence.

9.

See Douglas D. Scherer, Ton Remc:dies for Victims of Domestic Abuse, 43 S.C. L. Rev. 543,
565 (1992) : Weiner, supranore 2 , Rr 184--86 nn.I0-11 .

10. Clare Dalton, Domestic Violence, Domestic Torts: Constr.lints and Possibilities, 31 New Eng.
t. Re\'. 319. 378-85 o99n.
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practical barriers connected with ending an abusive relationship: it can be
dangerous to leave, and for many domestic violence survivors, there is a
reasonable fear of violent retaliation for the suit. 11 A victim who is married may
rationally fear that the potential defendam wiU use retaliatory legal tactics tn
the divorce. The psychological cost to the victim of asserting claims, which
necessarily involves continuing engagement with the abuser, may outweigh
the benefits of asserting and winning the claims.
The Theoretical Focus on Accidental Tnjury

A second reason for the lack of attention to domestic violence tons is that
relatively little attention has been paid to intentional torts in recent legal
scholarship. 12 ln significant part, that is because of the predominance of
economic theory in torts scholarship. Much law and economics scholarship,
implicitly or explicitly, defines ton Jaw as dealing with accidental injury. The
focus in the economic tort literature on designing ton rules to lead to an
optimal level of safety i_s ill suited to intentional torts, where the ultimate goal
is not an optimal level of intentional torts, but no imentional torts. An
additional reason is influential early commentary, such as by Oliver Wendell
Holmes in 1897 and Roscoe Pound in 1922, which treated intentional torts as
almost vestigial concerns of the past, in contrast to the more modern prob
lems of industrial injury. 13 When Holmes and Pound wrote, imerspousal
immunity was the rule, and domestic violence was invisible. The assumption in
their writing that ton Jaw should deal largely with hanns to stranger~rather
than, some times, family member~persists in the tom field. This assumption
excludes many intentional torts and all domestic violence torts from consider
ation and analysis. Consistent with the theoretical focus on accidental injury,
many torts casebooks devote a small proportion of their text to intentional
torts. 14 Concomitantly, many case books give only brief treatment to domestic
violence and domestic violence torts. 1!>
11. See Eliz.al>eth M. Schneider, Bauered Womc11 and Feminist Lawmaking 77-78 {New Haven,
2000}

12. A$ Anita Bernstein writes, •American ton law remains barren and primitive in areas where
insurance coverage is unavailable, espedally intentional torts." Rescatcmem (3d) of Tons:
Prescnplion of Masculine Order, 54 Van d. L Rev. 1367. 1S75 (2001 ).
13. See Qh,"Cr Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 467 (1897) (noting
that tort law ·comes from the old days of isolated, ungeneralized wrongs. slanders, and the
like ... (but contemporary torts} a.rc mainly the incidentS or certain well known businesses");
Roscoe Pound. An lmroduclion to the Philosophy of law 169-70 (New Haven. 1922)
(noting Ulal in "civilized society," intentional torts arc nota significant problem, and that for
"the sa,•agc" intentional attacks a.re a pri>blem and preclude the dtvision of labor that is
neccs~ary for civilization) .
14. lu most o f the 15 wru casebooks 1 reviewed geueraUy, 1.he imentionaltons of assault. battery,
f::tlse im pri~nment, intenrional or reckle.~~ infliction of emotional distress, conversion and
ues~ 1.0 chatte::l, and defeus~ to these LOriS, accounted for about one-tenth of eac h. For
example those tons and ciefense!i to them cake up about 7 percem of the text of Dobbs &
Hayden. 6 percent ofEpstcin; 5 percent ofFranklin & Rabjn; 13 percem ofjohnson & Gunn,
and 8 p ercent of Vetri et al (all supra note 5). This analysis does not inclucie defamation,
~landct , o~ other imentionalw• u notlist.ed

15. Of the five casebooks I reviewed closely (supra.nme 5) , Dobbs & Hayden and Vetri et aJ. had
the most detailed ueaunenL Epstein had the least detailed treatme nL Dobbs & Hayden
includes a problem on domestic violence (p. 37); discusses immunity (38fHl7) : includes a
case mvo lving the public duty rule where police failed 10 protect a woman from atcacks by her
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Given the focus of mainstream tort theory on accidental injury, it is not
surprising that domestic violence is rarely analyzed as a torte; issue. It 1s seen as
belonging to family law or criminal Law. Actually, domestic violence raises
important questions tor all these fields. The cases discussed here shed interest
ing light on family law and torrs in particular. The fact that domestic violence
torts overlaps these areas simply means that it helongs m all of them.
Part of my agenda is to resist the marginalization of intentional torts. The
draft Restatement (Third) ofTorts: General Principles states that "intentional torts
are deemed considerably more serious than torts of mere negligence," and
notes that "the plaintiff can be worse off if the tort is intentional rather than
negligent" because it is harder to obtain compensation for intentional torls
than for negligence. 16 The document is not specific as to the reasons that
intentional torts are deemed considerably more serious than negligent ones,
but it seems reasonable to assume that they are more serious because the
defendant's conduct is more culpable, or the plaintiffs injuries are more
serious, o r both. The same document says, "The problem of accidental injury is
what many sec as the core problem facing modem tort law.'' 17 If intentional
torts arc indeed considerably more serious than acts of "mere negligence,"
torts scholars and teachers should focus more on how the torts system is
working with respect to deterrence ofand compensation for intentional torts.
The "core problem" of modern torts should include the most serious torts.
Approaches
This section discusses several approaches to including domestic violence
torts in fin;c-year tortS courses. The first approach is to assign several cases
involving domestic violence. The second is to ask why there are so few
domestic violence tort cases and lead a discussion.on that and related ques
tions. The two approaches can be effectively combined.

rejected suitor ( 404-06) (Riss v N.Y., 293 N YS.2d 897 (NY. 1968)): includes a case involvmg
police failure to respond 10 a wurnaJI who had a protective order a~rd.inst her ex-husband
(41~22): has a note on ton claims for emotional hann dunngmaniage (505); and discusses
alienation of affections and cnmllla.l conversauon (93 I) . Epstein discusses husband-wife
immunity (1332-33). Johnson&: Cunn (cu rrenlly being revised for the third ediuon) has a
note asking whether spo~c: abuse that does not amount to bauery or assault should be
actionable under the ron or outrage (81): describes alienation of aftections and criminal
conversation (94) ; discusses interspousal immunity (801), and includes Ris.s v. N.Y. (496
500). franklin & Rabin cii~cwses criminal conversation and a.! Jenauon of affections (899
905); refeo to immunity (214); and includes Rl.ss v. N.Y. (226-30). Vctri ct al includes
Twyman v Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. l993) . wh1ch deals with inteouonal and negligent
infliction of c:rnutiunal disu ess clarm.\ between divorcing spowes and related material (816
22); discusses rhc public dmy rule in the context ofdomestic violence protecuve orders (32~
26); d•scu~se~ domestic violence in the context o f immunity (768) and statutes oflimicuions
(765) ; anci inclune~ a problem on spousal abuse (891>-97) .

16. Section 1 at 2-3 (Philadelphia. Discussion Draft, 1999) . The draft has heen retitled L1abilrty
for Physical Harm; Basic Principle:. (American Law luM.itute 2003) at <hup;//www.ali.org>
{last visited Aug. 20, 2008).

17. ld.. atx.xi.

Some of the most interesting ton cases pertaining to domestic violence are
those brought by an ex-spouse after a divorce alleging intentional infliction of
emotional <listress. These cases, discussed below, are useful in teaching about
the ton of intentional infliction of emotional disrress as well as issues reJated
to statutes of limitation, immunity, and releases.lmportam questions arise in
these cases. How should the Lon ofintentional infliction of emotional distress
be applied in a marilal or other intimate context? What is "extreme and
outrageous conduct" in a marital or other intimate context? How do (and how
should) courts deal with statutes of limitation in domestic violence tort cases,
a context where because of the circumstances in which they are committed,
the victim is unlikely to be able to sue promptly? Last, they present a way to
approach the underlying empirical question of who sues and gets sued for
intentional infliction of emotional distress or other domestic violence torts.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Disrress, Extreme and Outrageous
Conduct, and lnterspousallmmuruty
Henriksen v. Cameron, 18 a 1993 Maine Supreme Court case often cited by

other courts and commentators, upheld a jury verdict for an ex-wife against
her ex-husband for his intentional infliction of emotional disrress during the
marriage. The court had earlier adopted, and applied in another context, the
elements of the tort of outrage as defined by the Restatement (2d) of Torts
section 46: (1) intem or recklessness; (2) conduct so "extreme and outra
geous" as to exceed "all possible bounds of decency" and which must be
regarded as "atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community"; (3)
causation; and (1) emotional distress so "severe" that no "reasonable man
could be expected to endure it." 19 In Henriksen, the court accepted without
much discussion the jury's conclusion that the defendant had committed
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 20 lL said that his actions "ranged
from [defendant's] accusing Henriksen of 'sleeping with' his brother to his
raping and assaulting her." His actions also included
shattering the kitchen cabinets while he ~came after" her meanwhile calling
her a "lying, whoring bitch" who was "stealing money from him;" calling
Henriksen at a friend's house where she was staying because she was afraid r.o
come home and threatening to bum down [her] Inn; tearing down a wall in
Lhe dining room before she returned; s·waying over her bed and threatening
to "get" her ... pulling the telephone out of the wall and telling Henriksen he
did so to prevent her from calling for help."

18. 622 A2d 1135 (Me. 1993).
19. Jd. at 1139.
20. The jwy awarded Henriksen $75,000 in compensatory damages and $40,000 in punitive
damages. ld.. ar 1138
21. ld. at 1137 n.l. No crimmal charges were brought for the rape or any of defendant's other
actions.
·
·
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Although lawsuits for injuries caused by the defendant's actions would have
been barred by interspousal immunity in the past, the court concluded that
the policy reasons for imerspousal immunity were no longer viable, and so
completed its gradual rejection of it. The court reasoned that if the justifica
tion for interspousal immunity was to preserve marital harmony, no marital
harmony was left to preserve, since the parties were divorced. The court also
said that behavior that is "utterly intolerable in a civilized society and is
intended to cause severe emotional distress is not behavior that should be
protected in order to promote marital hannony and peace." Students may be
surprised to find that the court was jettisoning interspousal immunity as late as
1993. The court noted that "special caution" was required for intentional
infliction of emotional distress claims in the marital context because of the
dangers offrivolous litigation, and that summaryjudgment should be looked
at favorably in this contexL22
Regarding the potentially troublesome issue of what behavior is extreme
and outrageous in the marital context, since it is imponam that not every
disagreement give rise to ton liability, the court noted that "jurors, many of
whom are themselves married, are in the best possible position to determine
what behavior between spouses is 'arrocious and utterly intolerable in a
civilized community' and what behavior is 'within the normal ebb and flow' of
a marital relationship:·u Thus the coun seemed to caU for the application of
community standards, via the opinions of a particular jury, to the marriage.
This raises the issue of community standards (which relate to negligence
standards). If certain types of domestic violence are very, very common, can
they be truly extreme and outrageous? Should they be considered extreme
and outrageous?
A second provocative case about intentional infliction of emotional distress
is Feltmeierv. Feltmeier. 2~ The decision has language recognizing the seriousness
of domestic violence as well as its former invisibility, together with an instruc
tive policy discussion about intentional infliction of emotional distress which
implies that some interspousal violence is not tortious. Plaintiff's complaint,
filed after her divorce, alleged that her husband had physically beaten her at
least eleven times during the marriage, that he had physically restrained her
on more than one occasion, that he had thrown objects at her, verbally
attacked her, stalked her, and "systematically isolated her from family
and friends."25
Defendant claimed that the conduct alleged, even if true, was neither
extreme nor outrageous because of the "marital context" in which it arose. I Ie
further claimed that "any objectively reasonable woman could have endured

22. /d. at 1 I 38-40.
23. /d. at 1139.
24. 333 HI. App. 3d. 1167 (2002); Felune•erv. Feltme1er, 2003 WL 22145661 (Ill. 2003) (aJJinn
ingjudgment oflower court). The Illinois Supreme Coun's 2003 affirmance of the unemle·
diate coun's deas1on. 2003 WL 221456611, is 1mponant. but the intennediate coun·.~ 2002
opinion is more ~timulating for teaching purposes. so that is the opinion discussed her~.
25. 333 Ill. App. 3d al 1170.

518

JournalofLegalEducadon

the abuse that he is alleged to have administered without suffe ring severe
emotional distress." 26 He argued that since the alleged physical abuse oc
curred only three or four times a year, defendant's conduct was "marital
conduct that any reasonable wife should be able to endure without suffering
emotional distress," and thus the conduct was not extreme or outrageous.
The appellate court rejected this contention, describing the pattern of
abuse that typifies domestic violence:
Even though the abusive evenu; may occur only a handfuJ of times over the
course of a year, the repeated pattern of abuse inflicts daily psychic tor
ment .... Domestic violence and domestic abuse can take many forms. The
kind alleged here is extreme enough to be a ctionable. It combirtes mo re than
a decade ofverbaJ insults and humiliations with episodes whe re freedom of
movement wa.~ deprived and where physicaJ injury was otten tnflicted . . . .
(W]e are unwilling to dismiss it on grounds that it is unworth)' of outrage.''

As '\\<ith Henriksen, the facts involved a combination of physical and psychic
abuse, and the court found intentional infliction of emotional distress to be
an appropriate theory.
This case, like Henriksen, can be a useful vehicle for discussing the contours
of the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort. The court's policy
discussion, rejecting defendant's argument that his actions as alleged were not
extreme and outrageous, draws a distinction between this case and the ebb
and flow of married life:
We understand that married couples will get into arguments and that, on
occa.ston, those arguments wiU become heated. Spouses will most assuredly
bruise each other's feelings. And. from time to time, a husband will touch his
wife "'; than angry hand However, lhe marital conductalleged in this particular
case is different. 28

It is fascinating and disturbing Lhal lbe coun, while recognizing the tort,
seem:, to be saying that a husband's occasionally "touch [ing] his wife with an
angry hand" is not tortious within maniage, when such an act, as every Grsl
year law student learns, in other conLex!S (assuming there is no consent) is
a battery.
Conventional criticism of the intentional infliction of emotional disrress
ton asserts that the "extreme and outrageous" standard is very subjective and
varies according to the whim ofjuries.29 Such criticism further claims that the
entire tort actually collapses into the vague requirement of defendam's con
26. /d. The case involves an interlocutory appeal from the trial coun's demaJ of defendan t's
motion to dismiss. As such, 1t tests the sufficie ncy of the plaintiff's allcgallo llS.
27. SS Ill. App. 3d at 117{}-77.

28. ld.
29. See Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the LimitS of Evenhanded·
ness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous CondueL. 82 Colum. L lu:v.
<12 ( 1982). nus IS still an influential article. See Principles of the Law of Fatmly Dis3olution:
Analysis and Recommendatio ns 55 n.93 (Philadelphia, 2002). The article d•d not me ntion
use of Intentional n\fliction of emotionaJ distress in marital or other intimate comextS,
presuma bl)' because there were so few cases aL that time.
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duct having been extreme and outrageous. Two scholars who accept the
conventional criticism of Lhe tort have suggested that intentional infliction of
emotional distress should be available in the context of divorce only where
physical abuse that is a violation of the criminal law has taken place.~"
In considering the conventional criticism of the tort, it is importam to
remember that tort standards and decisions in general often are criticized as
subjective and variableY Further, while the elements of the ton are vague,
they are not meaningless. The requiremenL of extreme and outrageous con
duct focuses in large part on an objective assessment of the defendant's
conducr.!!2 A plaintiff can not win ~;imply because she does not Like the
conduct; it must be objectively extreme and omrageous conduct. In addition
to the intent and causation requirements, the tort requires, unlike other
intentional tort claims, that the plaintiffs emotional distress must he severe. It
is not sufficient that a plaintiff suffers emotional distress, but the d1stress must
be so severe that no reasonable person could endure it. So it is not accurate to
say that the entire tort collapses into the extreme and outrageous conduct
requirement. The tort arguably is not an abrupt departure from other lorts;
for example, it is similar to the tort of assault in that it does not require any
physical contact between defendant and plaintiff, and it protects mental and
emotional interests rather than physical ones. 33
I generally assign these domestic violence tort cases together with other
casebook materials on intentional infliction of emotional distress. I make sure
students understand the elements of the tort and its interesting history. Some
students are troubled by the vagueness of the "extreme and outrageous
conduct" requirement; others fed comfortable having a jury decide and
strongly resist the idea that a judge should ever decide that conduct is extreme
and ou1.rageous as a matter of law. Some are puzzled by, others outraged by,
others in agreement with the Feltmeiercourt's view that a husband's occasion
ally "touch [ing] his wife with an angry hand" is not tortious. Some (married)
students have articulated the view that words alone definitely should not be
sufficient to establish the tort, since in the heat of the moment, especially with
the stresses of young children, "extreme and outrageous" things may get said.
The potentially broad scope of this relatively new ton sheds light on
traditional torts such as assault and battery and invites discussion of whether
traditional torts "fit" che realities of domestic violence. Using Feltmeier, the
class can discuss whether traditional evem-centered Lorts like assault and
battery, which focus on a single physical incident, necessarily capture the
ongoing and varying nature of domestic violence or the damage it can cause,
much of which can be psychic.94 The wider lens of imentionat infliction of
30. lm M. Ellman &: Stephen D. Sugarman,
1268 (1996) .

Spou.~al

Emotional Abuse as a Tort? 55 Md. L Rev.

31 . See, e.g., Stephen D. Sugannan, Doing Away with Personal Injury Law: New Compensation
Mechanisms for Vicums. Consumers. and Husinesses (New York, 1989).

32. Civclh.-r, .n.tprn no1e 29, at 47.
33. See

Re~tatement

(Second) Torts,§§ 21 , 46 (Philadelphia, 1977)

34. Sec generally Dalton & Schneider, supra note <l; Schneider, supra note 11, at 6!)...66; De borah
Tuerkhe•mer, A Call to Criminalize Domcsuc Violence, 94J Cnm. L &: Cnmmology 101
(2004).

emotional distress may more accurately reflect the realities of domestic vio
lence than do traditional intentional torts.
One of the policy issues that arises with this ton is whether irs elements are
dear enough for potential defendants to have sufficient notice . Certainly the
standard that the defendant's behavior must strike the average commun ity
member as "outrageous" is murky. But in many contexts, as srudents often are
surprised to discover, the line between tortious and nontortious behavior is
hard to locate. As with other intentional torts, it is in society's best interest to
discourage conduct that is even close to the line. There is minimal, if any,
danger of overdeterrence. The lack of a clear line therefore is not as signifi
cant as with some other torts, such as strict liability torts. Students may
articulate slippery slope argwnents and ask whether the Lon of negligent
infliction of emotional distress can be brought in the marital or intimate
context. It seems that such claims have rarely been brought and generally have
not been recognized.
Other public policy issues worth discussing include the di.fficul ty of proving
or disproving allegations when the conduct at issue has taken place in private
and between people who formerly were intimate. This does not mean law has
to succumb to notions of privacy that may shelter abuse , but it does mean
special challenges of proof may arise.
Also Lhere is t.ht: question of the extent to which allowing intentional
infliction of emotional distress claims in the course of divorce, or between ex
spouses, conflicts wit.h the no-fault policy of divorce law.~ The historical torts
of criminal conversation and alienation of affections should be brought up
hert:. Criminal conversation meant simply that a defendant who engaged in
adultery with the plaintiff's spouse would be liable to the plaintiff. HistoricaUy
the plaintiff had to be tht: husband. For the defendant to be liable under the
alienation of affections tort, the defendant must have known of the marital
relationship, intended to affect it adversely, and deprived one spouse of the
other's affection, even if no adultery was committed. Both of these torts have
been abolished in most states. S6 A1though students may envision tons as a field
with ever-expanding liability, the abolition of these torts, like the abolition of
joint and several liabiliry in some sLates, modifies that idea. In South Dakota,
where the cause of action for alienation of affections persists, so that a man
can sue Lhe person with whom his wife has fallen in love, the state supreme
court has held that claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress can
not be asserted as a matter of policy when they are based on conduct that leads
to the end of a marriage." In Pickering v. Pickering, the ex-wife had lied to her
ex-husband about his paternity of a child born during the marriage, causing
him extreme distress and humiliation. lt does not appe:u that physical abuse
was involved. When he sued ht:r for intentional infliction of emotional dis
cress, the South Dakota Supreme Coun found that the lawsuit would subject

35. See Ellman & Sugarman, supra note 30.
36. Dan Dobbs, The Law ofTorts 124&-47 (SL Paul, 2000) .
37. Pickenng v. Pickering, 434 N.W.2d 758 (S.D. 1989).
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the child to ''interfamiliaJ warfare" and that "attempts to redress [the] wrong
may do more social damage than if the law leaves it alone . "~ But the alienation
of affections suit against the ex-wife's lover was allowed to continue. Pickering,
when contrasted with Feltmeierand Henriksen, can lead to a thought-provoking
discussion. The court's view of intentional infliction of emotional distress to
some extent echoes the justifications for interspousal tort immunity. Does
lying to a spouse about adultery and parenthood reach the outer bounds of
unusual behavior that the extreme and outrageous requirement is meant to
describe? Or is it cruel yet relatively common and not "extreme and outra
geous"? What are the costs and benefits when tort law gets involved in matters
concerning marital breakups?
Discussing the public policy issues provides a framework for discussion of
broader tort issues. Will imposition of liability deter? How often are victims
likely to receive compensation? Why does it matter? Are there particular
reasons why courts should be wary of applying this ton to intimate contexts?
Should the tort be limited in the marital or other intimate context to phys
ical abuse?
This issue of tort liability for harms from domestic violence can be used as a
starting point to discuss insurance and public policy. Intentional aces are
specifically excluded from liability coverage, so domestic violence torts are
generally excluded from liability coverage. One of the reasons for the exclu
sion is that insuring for intentional torts allows a person to profit from her
own wrong. She will be more strongly deterred from tortious conduct by the
threat of paying a judgmcm herself, than if the insurance company will pay
the judgment, the argument goes. This assumption about deterrence can be
explored and challenged. Given that most people have few assets that can be
collected to satisfy a tort judgment, how much of a deterrent is the threat of
financial liability anyway? And if the threat of financial liability is not much of
a deterrent, how much would insuring intentional torts really undermine
deterrence? One way of looking at the public policy issues is to say that the
public policy of not insuring for intentional tons contributes to the conse
quence that few imenlionaJ tort victims receive compensation.
The discussion may test students' intuitions about deterrence. Would the
imposition of civil liability for domestic violence torts (i.e., intentional torts)
create more or less deterrence than it does in the negligence area? The
discussion may be brought around to other functions of tort law. Even if
deterrence is unclear and compensation unlikely, does it matter what story
tort law tells about interspousal injury? Does the assertion that law should stay
out of the private realm unless there is physical abuse tend to reproduce
inequalities that existed in the first place?

38. /d. at 762. Another provocative public policy discussion is found in a New Mexico Coun of
Appeal~ decision, Hakkila v. Rakkila, 812 P.2d 1320 (N.M. 1991 ). Hakltila recognized the tort
ofintentional infliction ofemotional distress but found its elements not satisfied by the facts
in that ca.~ Haklr.ila, and mrer('Sting questions a hour it, are included in Dalton &: Schneider,
supra note 4, at 827-84.
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Statutes ofLimitation

lt is hard lO talk aboul domestic violence torts without talking about
statutes of limitalioos. Because of the circumstances in which the torrs are
committed, it is difficult for plaintiffs to sue expeditiously.~9 As I mentioned,
the st.atut.e of limitations for traditional intentional tons is often shorter than
for other torts, so statute of limitations issues arise often.
Those issues were important in Feltmeier v . Felimeier, since in that case the
appellate courtS adopted the continuing tort theory for intentional infliction
of emotional distress claims. A two-year statute of limitations applied to such
claims, as well ac; to assault and battery claims. Defendant argued that each
new act of abuse triggered a new statute of Limitations, so that any act that
occurred more than two years before the complaint was filed would be time
barred. The plaintiff argued that the continuing ton theory applied, so that
the defendant's behavior should be looked at as a whole, and the statute of
limitations would not begin to run until the last act of abuse or the continuing
behavior ended. illinois had applied that doctrine in a va1·iety of circum
stances, including nuisance, trespass, a long-term check-cashing scheme, medi
cal malpractice, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court
agreed with the plaim.iff, joining other courts in fmding that the continuing
tort theory should apply in domestic abuse cases: the two-year statute of
limitations for intentional infliction of emotional disrress would begin to run
on the date of the lasL injury or when the tortious acts stopped. Plaintiff did
not assert assaull and battery claims because there was no plausible argument
that the continuing ton theory would apply to tbem.10 The pla.int.ifrs claims,
which involved activities over an eleven-year period that continued after t.he
divorce, were not time-barred. The W>e of the contiuuing Lort theory in this
context can be included in a larger discussion aboul statutes of limitation in
other contexts, such as the discovery rule in medical malpractice cases.
Henriksen presents another example of how statute of limitations issues
arise in domestic violence tort cases. The statute of limitations for assault and
battery was two years, while the statute of limitations for intentional infliction
of emotional distress was six years." 1 Henriksen claimed to have been assaulted
and raped by her husband, yet all of these actions occurred more than two
years before she filed suiL Many of these actions occurred more than two years
but less than six years before she filed suit. Therefore, the plaintiff could not
bring an assaulL and battery claim, but had to proceed on intentional inflic

39. Some casebooks (see supra note 5) cover starute:. of! imitation and some do not. Epstein and
franklin & Rabin do nol discuss statutes of limitation. Dobbs 8c Hayden discusses Statutes of
limitation. johnson 8c Gunn notes Lh.at scarutes of limitation for intentional oorts generally
are shorter rhan for other torts (825-26) . Vetri et al. uses an example ofdomestic violence in
highlighting various statute of limitations issues (765-66) .
4.0. lmeniew wilh plaintiff's attorney Morris Lane HaiVey, Aug. 2003. See also Dalton, supra note
10.

41. 622 A.2d al 1142. The intentional infliction of emotional distress claim feU within the
residual statute of limitations thar applied exct:pt where a specific Statute of limitations
cxbted.Jat:k H. Simmons t:lal., Maine Tort Law.§ 17.11 (Charlottesville, 2001) .
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tion of emotional distress alone. 42 She was able to introduce evidence of
assaullS (including the rape) that had happened more than two years before
suir was filed, but within six years before suit was filed, for the purpose of
seeking recovery for only the emotional harm caused by the assaults. as opposed
to recovery for the physical harm they cansed. 4ll Whether the jury accepted this
mental/physical distinction is anyone's guess.
This is an excellent area in which to remind studenrs of the imporrance of
legislation in torts. Legislation in some states has tackled the statUte of limita
tions issues that frequendy arise in this area. California, for example, provides
that domestic violence tort cases must be filed within three years of the later of
two events: the date of the last act of domestic violence, or the date that the
p laintiff discovered or should have discovered that the plainti..ff's illness or
injury resulLed from defendant's act of domestic violence. 44 This, in effect,
adopts by statute the continuing ton theory. Michigan provides a longer
period for suits for domestic violence torts than for other types of torrs. 43 Some
students may argue that the lcgisJarure is the appropriate forum for changes
in statutes of limitation, and this can be profitably discussed. 46
Underlying Empirical Issues: Who Sues and Gets Sued?
A critically important aspc::ct of Henriksen that may seem incidental at first is
that the plaintiff owned a "seasonal hotel, the Tides Inn," on the Maine coast,
and she operated it with her husband:" Why doel:l this mattt:r? The answer ties
in with the general points made earlier about the rarity of reported cases of
domestic violence torlS. The plaintiff owned property and received income
from the property. Unlike many postdivorce women, she had the funds to hire
a lawyer to bring the case.18 Defendant, although this does not come out in the
opinion. also had assets and the funds to hire a lawyer w defend the case::. If
42. She iniliallt• as.sened a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, but Lhe uiaJ judge
entered a dtrected verdict for Lhe defendant on tllis claim, and Lhis action was not disturbed
on appeal. 622 A.2d at1112.

43. /d. a t 1143.
44. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code§ 3-40.15 (West2000).

45. 59 Mach. StaL Ann. § 600.6805 (Mich1e 2002) (five-year statute oflimitations for assault or
battCT)" brought by penon assaulted or b:mered by fonner spouse or intimate partner; two
years for olher assault and battery).
46. Release~ are now commonly ohtained m lhe course of divorces, and therr enforceability can

raise intc:ro.ting public policy ~uc:<>, detailed discussion ofwhich is beyond the scope of tlus
article. In Henriksen, the court suggeued that if Cameron's lawyer had gouen a general
releill>c, it would have barred tllc claim. 622 A.2d a t ll42. But when t.he parties were divorced
10 1984 in Maine, 11 w;u not routin~ praclic~ to use such releases. and Cameron did not sue
his d t\·orce lawyer for failing to ensure that he got one. In Ftltmeier, the dh·orce settlement
included releases, but the coun decided that public policy precluded enforcement of
boilcrplau: language and lhat lhe continuing tort theory mean t tltdt.lhe cause of action did
not :mseo unril after Lhe agreement was signed (since defendant'~ abusive behavior continued
after lhe d ivorce). 33 Jll . App.3d at 1182-8!!. Th~ d~tussio11 can be made part of a laJ·ger
discussion about seulement, releases, and the imp<~nance of finality (as well as of other
competing considerations).
47. 622 A.2d

31

1137.

48. N. an associate 1\\oa.s involved in lhc preuial stages of the case. representing the plaintiff.
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not for those factors, there would have been no lawsuiL and therefore no
reported case. Similarly, in Feltmeier, the defendant had an ongoing successful
business with assets.4 9 These cases a re the exceptions; the general rule is that
no litigation will result from the types of actions alleged in these cases.
In sum, Henriksen, Feltmeier, and Pickering can be used to discuss inten
tional infliction of emotional distress, stawtes of limitation, and immunity,
as well as many public policy issues including those pertaining to insurance
and deterrence.
Why So Few Domestic Violence Tort Cases?

A seco nd approach is to tell students bow few reponed cases there appear
co be on domestic violence wrts, compared with the incidence of domestic
violence, and to ask why there are so few. Some students may bring up
interspousal immunity, but as case books make clear, formally it is almost if not
totally dead. 50 Moving beyond immunity, barriers to litigation include the
intentional acts exclusion and Lhe family member exclusion in liability insur
ance policies; shon statutes of limitation; LOrtfeasors who lack assets or who
own assets jointly with plaintiffs; procedural barriers; and other barriers, such
as threats of retaliation and the need to move on. It is clear that the actual
number of cases filed seeking recovery for domestic violence injuries is many
times less than the number of actual injuries from domestic violence.
The why-so-few-cases discussion could lead to discussion of"naming/ blarn
ing/claiming" behavior-51 and what Marc Galanter and others call the dispute
pyramid. 52 While there are widespread perceptions that Americans sue at the
drop of a hat, that the torts system is overburdened to the crushing point by
spurious lawsuits, and that runaway juries often make absurd punitive dam
ages awards, many scholars have argued that the reality is quite differenL ~For
example, the Harvard srudy of medical malprc1ctice in New York concluded
that "eight times as many patients suffered an injury from negligence as fiJed a
malpractice claim in New York State. About sixteen times as many patients
suffered an injury from negligence as received compensation from the tort
liability system."5• While in the automobile injury context claiming rates are
49. Couvc:rsat.ion with plaintiff's auomey Moni5 Lane: Harvey, june 2. 2003.
50. See supra note 15. See also Carl Tobias, The lmminem Demise of Jmerspousal Ton Immu
nity, 60 Mont. L Rev. 101 (1999) .
51. See William L. F. Felstiner el al., The Emerg·e ncc and Traruformation ofDuputcs: Naming,
Blaming. and Claiming, 15 Law&: Soc·y Rev. 631 (1980) (describing complex process by
which injured people comt: to recognize htiuries and make daims fo r them, and suggesting
that many injuries do not become claims) . Alternatively, one could start ""-ith the naming.
IJiamiug, daiming discussion in another context such a:. medical malpractic~ and move to
the domestic violence conteXL
52. Real World Tons: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 Md. L. Rev. 1093, 1099-1103 (1996).
53. See. e.g., id. ; Deborah J. Merritt & Kathryn A. Barry, b the Tons System in Crisis? New
Empirical Evidence. 60 Ohio SL LJ. 315 ( 1999) ; Richard L. Abel, The Real Ton Cnsis-Too
Fe"" Claims, -48 Ohio St. LJ. 445 ( l987).
!H. PatientS, Doctors, and Lawyers: Medica! Injury, Malpractice Litigation, and Patient Compen
&ation in New York.: The Report of the Harvard MedkaJ Study to the State of New York 6
(NewYork, 1990).
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hlgh, in other contexts they are not.s 5 Domestic violence injuries occur in a
context where claiming rates mus[ be low, in contrast to automobile iJ1iuries,
where there is an insurance system designed for compensation (mandatory
liabili(y insurance plus mandatory uninsured mowristcoverage) and differing
cultural expectations.116
This could lead to discussion about criminal prosecution of those inten
tional torts that are crimes, compared with civil compensation for injuries
caused by the same acts. Most of these acts are criminal; why isn't criminal
prosecution enough, or is it.? Deterrence is a goal of both criminal and tort
law, yet the empirical evidence that either system deters is far from clear. H Tf
tort law in general does deter, the fact that there are so few lawsuits for
domestic violence tons injuries means that tort law is not deterring in this
area. Moreover, compensation is a central purpose of tort law, whereas com
pensation is not a central purpose of criminal law. What about victims'
compensation programs? Compensation rarely goes tO domestic violence
victims.58 Students may be familiar with the now common civil injunctions that
victims ofdomestic violence may obtain against abusers. Many of these statutes
provide that economic reliefcan be awarded in an injunction proceeding. Bm
rarely is compensation awarded under these statutes.
Another important difference berween criminal and civil matters in this
context is that the decision about whether to prosecute criminally rests with
lhe prosecutor, while the decision to pursue a tort claim rests with the victim
(and her lawyer). Third, criminal defendants have constitutional protec
tions-such as the Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination
and the right to an attorney if threatened withjail-that civil defendants lack.
The threat o( imprisonment in criminal cases is linked with a heightened
standard of proof, while the threat ofmonetary loss in civil cases is linked with
a more relaxed standard of proof. In theory, because of the different standard
55. Deborah R. Hensler etal., Rand lnst. for Civil justice, Compensation for Accidc:mallnjuries
in the United States, 20-21 (Washington, 1991) (finding that the wclaiming rate" for motor
vehicle i~juries was 44 percent, for work injuries 7 percent, forotherinjuries 3 percent, based
on national suJVey of claiming behavior).
56. Sec generally Wriggins, Juj'lra note 3.
57. Regarding deren·ence created by civil liability, see, e.g. Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the
Economic Analysis ofTort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter? 4.2 UCLA L. Rev. 377, SBl-90
(1994). Rt:!fclrding deterrence created by criminal liability, see, e.g., DanielS. Nagin. Crimi
nal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-first Century. 23 Crime &jusL 1 (1998).
l am not awan: of any definitive studies concerning the deterrent effect of criminal or civil
liability for domestic violence. It may be interesting to discuss whether the threat of liability
deters imen donal torts more than tons ofnegligence, or less.ln discussing this question wilh
many people, J have received remarkably divergent answers. Many people think that lhe
threat of lort liability would not deter domestic violence because domestic violence i$
impulsive, unreasoned action, whereas the threat of liability 1JJOuld deter in the context of
negligence be<Awc excn:ising care is something that is based on reason and consciousness.
But many other people think exactly the opposite: that the threat of tort liability would deter
domestic violence because domestic violence is intentional, where<U the threat of negligence
liability does not derer negligence because it is not intentional At work here may be differing
concepiS ofdomestic violence-as actions of~pa.ssion" (a more traditional view) or as actions
ofcontrol (a more recent conceptualization).
58. While every state has victim compensation programs, they provide minimal compensation to
victims of domestic violence. Wriggins, supra note 3, at 147 nn.135-36.
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of proof and other factors, civil cases could be brought and won more
frequently than criminal prosecutions, and the expected deterrent effect
from the threat of civil liability might then be greater than the effect from the
threat of criminal liability.
One can also lead a broader discussion of the ways the tort system treats
different injuries. One could contrast the likelihood that a faultless driver will
receive compensation for her injuries with the likelihood that a victim of
domestic violence will receive compensation for her injuries. Policy choices
such as requiring car insurance and requiring uninsured motorist coverage,
which spread risk broadly, make it reasonable to conclude that the likelihood
ofan injured driver's receiving compensation is far higher than the likelihood
that an injured domestic violence tort victim will receive compensation. Re
lated issues include the different ways that the tort system has treated mental
versus physical injury, discussed provocatively in the recent United States
Supreme Court decision Norfolk & Western Railway v. Ayers.5 9 There may or may
not be compelling reasons for the differences in treatment; the differences
are at least worth discussing.

*****
The spectrum of issues that the first-year tons course can deal with is
wonderfully wide. Deciding what to include and what to exclude is a perpetual
challenge. The prevalence ofdomestic violence and its tonious nature presem
strong arguments for discussing it in first-year Torts. The intentional infliction
of emouonal distress cases discussed above offer a compelling context for
learning both about domestic violence and abouc the importance and prob
lematic aspects of this tort. Further, key aspectS of each case link both with
critical aspects of torts and with salient aspects of domestic violence. For
example, the starute oflimit.ations aspects ofFeltmeierand Henri/,senilluminate
statute of limitations issues generally and domestic violence specifi<.:.ally. As we
see from analysis of those cases, applying traditional evem·ba.sed sunutes of
limitations to traditional evem·based torts like assault and ba[tery often leads
LO exclusion of domestic violence tort claims. For domesLic violence ton
victims to seek tort n::dn:ss, they often must use the ntwer theory of inten
tional inflictloo of emotional d istress and have access to the continuing ton
theory or to a statute tailored to domestic violence torts. Moreover, these
cases, by their very rariry, highlight structures that prevent redress of domestic
violence through the tort system except in extremely unusual circumstances.
Analysis of these and other domestic violence ton cases grounds the tons
cutTiculum in broad contemporary realities and provides insight into tmpor
tam doctrinal and public policy issues that are central to torts as a field.

59. Norfolk & Western Railway''· Ayers, 123 S. Ct. 1210 (2003).

